



JUVENTUS

REPORT ON THE REMUNERATION POLICY AND COMPENSATION PAID

APPROVED BY THE BOARD
OF DIRECTORS ON
26 SEPTEMBER 2025

2025

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DEFINITIONS

Unless otherwise defined, the capitalised terms used in this document shall have the following meanings.

“CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER”

The Chief Executive Officer of Juventus in office at the time.

“SHAREHOLDERS’ MEETING”

The ordinary or extraordinary meeting of Juventus shareholders, as the case may be.

“ITALIAN CIVIL CODE”

Italian Royal Decree No. 262 of 16 March 1942, as subsequently amended and supplemented.

“CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE”

The Corporate Governance Code of listed companies approved in January 2020 by the Corporate Governance Committee.

“BOARD OF STATUTORY AUDITORS”

The Board of Statutory Auditors of Juventus in office at the time.

“REMUNERATION AND APPOINTMENTS COMMITTEE” OR “COMMITTEE”

The “Remuneration and Appointments Committee” of Juventus in office at the time.

“BOARD OF DIRECTORS”

The Board of Directors of Juventus in office at the time.

“DATE OF THE REPORT”

26 September 2025.

“GENERAL MANAGER”

The General Manager of Juventus in office at the time.

“KEY MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL” OR “KMP”

The persons so defined in the Appendix to the CONSOB Related-Party Regulation.

“INFORMATION DOCUMENT”

The information document relating to the LTI Plan, prepared pursuant to Article 114-*bis* of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance and 84-*bis* of the Issuers’ Regulation, available at the registered office, on the Company’s website (www.juventus.com, in the Club, Investors, Shareholders’ Meetings section) and on the authorised storage mechanism “1Info” (www.1info.it).

“GROUP”

Juventus and its subsidiaries pursuant to Article 93 of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance.

“JUVENTUS” OR “ISSUER” OR “COMPANY”

Juventus Football Club S.p.A.

“LTI PLAN”

Has the meaning given to it under Section I, paragraph 3 of this Report.

“REMUNERATION POLICY”

The Company’s remuneration policy described in this Remuneration Report.

“2024 REMUNERATION POLICY”

The remuneration policy in force at the date of this Report, approved by the Shareholders’ Meeting of 7 November 2024.

“CHAIRPERSON”

The Chairperson of the Board of Directors of Juventus in office at the time.

“RELATED PARTIES PROCEDURE”

The “Procedure for the management of transactions with related parties “ of Juventus.

“CONSOB RELATED-PARTY REGULATION”

CONSOB regulation no. 17221 of 12 March 2010 laying down rules on transactions with related parties, as subsequently amended and supplemented.

“ISSUERS’ REGULATION”

The Regulation implementing the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance, concerning the regulation of issuers, adopted by CONSOB with resolution no. 11971 of 14 May 1999, as subsequently amended and supplemented.

“REPORT” OR “REMUNERATION REPORT”

This “Report on the remuneration policy and compensation paid” of Juventus, drawn up pursuant to Article 123-*ter* of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance and in compliance with Article 84-*quater* and Annex 3A, Schedule 7-*bis*, of the Issuer” Regulation, available at the registered office, on the Company’s website (www.juventus.com, in the Club, Investors, Shareholders’ Meetings section) and on the authorised storage mechanism “1Info”(www.1info.it).

“CG REPORT”

The Report on Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure that companies issuing securities admitted to trading on regulated markets are required to prepare pursuant to Article 123-*bis* of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance.

“SHORT TERM INCENTIVE” OR “STI PLAN”

Has the meaning given to it under Section I, paragraph 3 of this Report.

“BY-LAWS”

It means the By-Laws of Juventus in force as of the Date of the Report.

“TOTAL REWARD FRAMEWORK”

Has the meaning given to it under Section I, paragraph 3 of this Report.

“ITALIAN CONSOLIDATED LAW ON FINANCE”

Italian Legislative Decree no. 58 of 24 February 1998, as subsequently amended and supplemented.

INTRODUCTION

This Juventus Remuneration Report has been prepared pursuant to Article 123-ter of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance and Article 84-quater of the Issuers' Regulation.


The Report - approved by the Board of Directors, on the proposal of the Remuneration and Appointments Committee - is divided into two Sections, drawn up in accordance with Annex 3A, Schedule 7-bis of the Issuers' Regulation.

Section I of the Report provides the market with information regarding the policy of Juventus on the subject of the remuneration of members of the management bodies, the General Manager, Key Management Personnel and members of the control bodies, as well as the procedures used for the adoption and implementation of this policy. The Remuneration Policy: (i) is structured on the basis of the business environment in the professional sports industry the Company operates in and the complexity of its organisational structure; and (ii) takes into account the Issuer's *status* as a listed company and is therefore drawn up in line with the recommendations on remuneration of the Corporate Governance Code, with which the Company complies. Furthermore, as of the Date of the Report, the Issuer has identified - in addition to the members of the Board of Directors and the Board of Statutory Auditors - 2 Key Management

Personnel. Section I - prepared in accordance with Article 123-ter, paragraph 3, of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance - will be submitted for approval to the Shareholders' Meeting, pursuant to Article 123-ter, paragraphs 3-bis and 3-ter, of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance.

Section II of the Report provides a representation of the individual entries that make up the remuneration of the Directors, the General Manager, Key Management Personnel and Auditors as well as a detailed representation of the compensation paid by the Company to these individuals in the 2024/2025 financial year, for any reason and in any form, and by any subsidiaries or associates. This section - prepared in accordance with Article 123-ter, paragraph 4, of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance - will be submitted to the non-binding vote of the Shareholders' Meeting, pursuant to Article 123-ter, paragraph 6, of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance.

The Remuneration Policy may be subject to review by the Company's Board of Directors, upon proposal by the Remuneration and Appointments Committee. Each revision of the Remuneration Policy will be submitted to the approval of the Shareholders' Meeting, pursuant to Article 123-ter, paragraph 3-bis, of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance.



LETTER FROM THE CHAIR OF THE REMUNERATION AND APPOINTMENTS COMMITTEE

Dear Shareholders,

2025 opened as a crucial year for Juventus Football Club S.p.A., marked by strategic choices and a growing awareness of the role that governance and economic sustainability must play in the future of the club. In this context, I have the honour of presenting the Report on the remuneration policy and compensation paid, a document that reflects our commitment to building a solid, responsible and competitive Juventus.

The Remuneration and Appointments Committee has worked with the aim of strengthening the link between leadership and generated value, in line with the expectations of ownership that continues to carefully monitor the recovery and recovery path undertaken. Juventus is not just a financial asset, but a sporting and cultural heritage worthy of a long-term vision.

The remuneration policy for the 2025/2026 financial year is based on the criteria of transparency, sustainability and meritocracy. We have introduced even more selective incentive mechanisms, capable of rewarding not only sporting results, but also the ability to contribute to the organisational transformation and economic stability of the club.

Juventus has embarked on a path of managerial and cultural evolution, aimed at strengthening the consistency between sports performance, economic sustainability and social responsibility. In this context, the Committee has revised the remuneration criteria with the aim of making them more dynamic, inclusive and oriented towards creating value in the medium to long term.

I would like to thank the members of the Committee for their expert contribution and for the shared vision that has guided our work. This Report is not only a matter of regulatory compliance, it is also a means for stimulating dialogue with our stakeholders in order to strengthen trust and promote a corporate culture based on integrity, responsibility and ambition.

Laura Cappiello

Chairperson of the Remuneration and Appointments Committee

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

REMUNERATION POLICY

Juventus' Remuneration Policy is defined in keeping with the corporate governance model adopted by the Company and in line with the recommendations of the Corporate Governance Code. It is based on the following principles:

- alignment of interests between management and Shareholders, with a view to creating sustainable value;
- direct link between remuneration and performance in both financial and sustainability matters;
- alignment with best market practices, in order to ensure overall consistency and competitiveness with respect to the context/sector;
- meritocracy, fairness and transparency as cornerstones of the remuneration strategy;
- focus on sustainability by including ESG goals, which are consistent with the corporate strategy, in the incentive systems.

The Total Reward Framework is the tool adopted since 2022 in order to apply the principles of the Remuneration Policy in a fair, transparent and inclusive manner at each level of the organisation and with the aim of supporting a corporate culture striving to create sustainable value in the long term.

A summary of the main remuneration components of the Remuneration Policy is reported below:

Remuneration Component	Purpose	Conditions for implementation	Amounts/Benefits assigned
Fixed Remuneration	Attracting, motivating and retaining resources through salaries proportionate to the assigned responsibilities, skills and experience	Verification of salary positioning compared to market salary levels, based on the role and responsibilities assigned	<p>Chairperson: Euro 440,000 of which:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Euro 40.000¹ as remuneration for the office of director, pursuant to Articles 2364, paragraph 1, no. 3) and 2389, paragraph 1, of the Italian Civil CodeEuro 400.000 as remuneration for the office of Chairperson, pursuant to Article 2389, paragraph 3 of the Italian Civil Code <p>Chief Executive Officer: Euro 840.000 of which:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Euro 40.000² as remuneration for the office of director, pursuant to Articles 2364, paragraph 1, no. 3) and 2389, paragraph 1, of the Italian Civil CodeEuro 800.000³ as remuneration for the office of Chief Executive Officer, pursuant to Article 2389, paragraph 3 of the Italian Civil Code <p>General Manager: Euro 1.000.000</p> <p>Other KMP: proportionate to the assigned role and experience</p>
Short-term variable incentive (STI Plan)	Promoting the achievement of annual business and sustainability targets, defined consistently with the Budget	<p>Chairperson: non-beneficiary of the STI Plan</p> <p>CEO, General Manager and other KMP - Targets:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">Economic/financial KPI, represented by EBIT (weight 70%)Strategic function KPIs (weight 20%)ESG KPI (weight 10%) <p>There is a de-multiplier that entails a 20% reduction in the event of a zero or negative Net Profit.</p> <p>A gate is also envisaged, represented by the qualification of the Men's First Team for the Champions League in the 2026/2027 season. If the gate target is not achieved, for the Chief Executive Officer, the General Manager and other Key Management Personnel, the bonus will not be accrued, regardless of the level of achievement of the Performance Targets.</p> <p>The STI plan includes the application of the <i>malus</i> and claw-back clauses</p>	<p>CEO: target incentive equal to 100% of annual gross fixed remuneration for the office of Chief Executive Officer</p> <p>General Manager and other KMP: target incentive equal to 50% of respective annual gross fixed pay</p> <p>Maximum incentive, equal to 150% of target incentive</p>

¹ It should be noted that the Board of Directors in office as at the Report Date will expire upon approval of the financial statements as at 30 June 2025 by the Shareholders' Meeting scheduled for 7 November 2025. In this context, the Shareholders' Meeting will be called upon to appoint a new managing body and determine the relevant remuneration.

² It should be noted that the Board of Directors in office as at the Report Date will expire upon approval of the financial statements as at 30 June 2025 by the Shareholders' Meeting scheduled for 7 November 2025. In this context, the Shareholders' Meeting will be called upon to appoint a new managing body and determine the relevant remuneration.

³ It can be increased up to the higher fixed compensation allocated in accordance with the Remuneration Policy.

Remuneration Component	Purpose	Conditions for implementation	Amounts/Benefits assigned
Long-term variable incentive (LTI Plan)	Promoting the pursuit of sustainable success in the long term, through the achievement of performance objectives consistent with the strategic plan, while ensuring the retention of the critical resources of Juventus	<p>The Plan is aimed, <i>inter alia</i>, at the Chief Executive Officer, General Manager and other Key Management Personnel (KMP) and provides for three rolling annual cycles of assignment of the Company's ordinary shares.</p> <p>The accrual of the Performance Share rights will be subject to the achievement of financial and non-financial performance indicators at the end of the vesting period of each cycle of the LTI Plan.</p> <p>The LTI plan includes the application of <i>malus</i> and claw-back clauses.</p> <p>In particular, the Chief Executive Officer, General Manager and KMP have been assigned, <i>inter alia</i>, the obligation to hold continuously a number of shares equal to 100% of those to be assigned until the expiry of 24 months from the delivery of the shares, net of those transferable for the payment of tax, social security and welfare expenses, where due, connected to the assignment of the shares.</p> <p>The performance indicators, common for all beneficiaries, are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">EBIT-Adjusted Cash Flow MatrixESG KPI: gender equality certificationRelative Total Shareholder Return with respect to the FTSE Mid Cap stock market index	<p>CEO, General Manager and other KMP: a target LTI share of 50% of the gross fixed remuneration is envisaged.</p> <p>The target LTI share corresponds to a target number of shares, determined by dividing this value by the arithmetic mean of the Stock Exchange price of an ordinary Juventus share during the three months prior to the vesting period.</p> <p>Depending on the achievement of the objectives, the number of shares vested may vary from a minimum of 0% up to a maximum of 150% of the target number of shares.</p>
Non-monetary benefits	Supplementing the remuneration package	Chairperson, CEO, General Manager and other KMP Benefits according to the Total Reward Framework	Remuneration is supplemented with non-monetary benefits (such as, for example, the use of company cars or car allowance) and with supplementary forms of insurance such as directors' third-party liability policies and supplementary health insurance.
Indemnity for termination of office and/or relationship	N.A	N.A	There are no agreements between the Company and the directors, General Manager or other Key Management Personnel providing for allowances or other special benefits in the event of termination of the office or of the employment or collaboration relationship (without prejudice to legal provisions), or agreements that include non-compete clauses.

SECTION I

1. BODIES INVOLVED IN PREPARING, APPROVING AND IMPLEMENTING THE REMUNERATION POLICY

The preparation, approval and implementation of the Remuneration Policy involves the following bodies and persons, each within their own sphere of competence:

- the Board of Directors;
- the Remuneration and Appointments Committee;
- the Shareholders’ Meeting;
- the Board of Statutory Auditors;
- the Independent Auditors.

In particular, the Remuneration Policy may first be submitted to the Board of Directors for approval by the Remuneration and Appointments Committee. In drawing up the Policy, the Remuneration and Appointments Committee involves the People, Culture & ESG Department, with the added aim of gathering market data in terms of practices, policies and benchmarking, ensuring regulatory compliance and making improvements to the preparation of the policy itself, and, where necessary, also involves independent experts.

The Board of Directors, upon proposal of the Remuneration and Appointments Committee, defines and adopts the Remuneration Policy in all its forms and sources of internal regulations and, more specifically, its contents as summarised in the paragraphs relating to the Remuneration Policy. The Board of Directors, having examined and approved the Remuneration Policy, submits it to the binding vote of the Shareholders’ Meeting, making it available at least 21 days prior to the call date of the Shareholders’ Meeting, through publication, pursuant to procedures laid down by law and regulations, of the Report on Remuneration Policy and Compensation Paid.

The Remuneration Report received the favourable opinion of the Remuneration and Appointments Committee on 26 September 2025 and was approved by the Board of Directors on the same date.



Where the Shareholders’ Meeting does not approve the Remuneration Policy submitted to voting pursuant to Article 123-ter, paragraph 3-bis of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance, Juventus will continue to pay remuneration in accordance with the most recent

remuneration policy approved by the Shareholders’ Meeting. In such a case, Juventus will put a new Remuneration Policy to the vote of the shareholders, at the latest, at the next Shareholders’ Meeting pursuant to Article 2364, paragraph 2 of the Italian Civil Code.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

As mentioned above, the definition of the Juventus Remuneration Policy is the responsibility of the Board of Directors, with the aid of advice and recommendations from the Remuneration and Appointments Committee.

In the context of the definition and implementation of the Remuneration Policy, *inter alia*, the Board of Directors resolves on the following matters:

- (i) allocation of remuneration set for the directors by the Shareholders’ Meeting (if not already provided for by the same) and remuneration payment pursuant to Article 2389, paragraph 3 of the Italian Civil Code;
- (ii) definition and approval of incentive plans to be submitted to the Shareholders’ Meeting, pursuant to Article 114-bis of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance;
- (iii) implementation and execution of the incentive plans approved by the Shareholders’ Meeting;
- (iv) approval, implementation and execution of the incentive plans that do not require a resolution by the Shareholders’ Meeting pursuant to Article 114-bis of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance;
- (v) composition of the Remuneration and Appointments Committee;
- (vi) approval and submission to the Shareholders’ Meeting of the Remuneration Policy pursuant to Article 123-ter of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance.

REMUNERATION AND APPOINTMENTS COMMITTEE

For information on the Remuneration and Appointments Committee, please refer to Section I, paragraph 2, of this Report.

SHAREHOLDERS’ MEETING

The Shareholders’ Meeting:

- (i) determines the total remuneration of the members of the Board of Directors pursuant to Articles 2364, paragraph 1, no. 3), and 2389 of the Italian Civil Code;
- (ii) resolves, with a binding vote, on Section I of the Report, pursuant to Article 123-ter, paragraph 3 *ter*, of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance;
- (iii) resolves, with a non-binding vote, on Section II of the Report, pursuant to Article 123-ter, paragraph 6, of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance;
- (iv) resolves on any remuneration plans based on shares or other financial instruments intended for Directors, employees and collaborators, including Key Management Personnel, pursuant to Article 114-bis of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance.

BOARD OF STATUTORY AUDITORS

Pursuant to Article 2389, paragraph 3 of the Italian Civil Code and Article 20 of the By-Laws, the Board of Statutory Auditors expresses its opinion on the remuneration proposals of directors vested with special offices or powers.

INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

The Independent Auditors check that the Directors have prepared Section II of the Report, pursuant to Article 123-ter, paragraph 8-bis of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance.

2. COMPOSITION, RESPONSIBILITIES AND OPERATION OF THE REMUNERATION AND APPOINTMENTS COMMITTEE

The Board of Directors has established the Remuneration and Appointments Committee, which has been assigned, within the scope of its responsibilities, functions of investigation, consultation and proposal vis-à-vis the management body, for the purpose of promoting continuous incorporation of national and international best practices on appointments and remuneration into Juventus’ corporate governance.

With regard to remuneration, the Committee performs the following functions, in line with the provisions of the Corporate Governance Code:

- 1. support the Board of Directors in drawing up the remuneration policy;
- 2. submitting proposals or expressing opinions to the Board of Directors on the remuneration of the executive directors and directors who hold special roles, as well as setting performance objectives for the variable component of the remuneration;
- 3. monitoring the practical application of the remuneration policy and verifying, in particular, the actual attainment of the performance objectives;
- 4. periodically evaluating the adequacy and the overall consistency of the remuneration policy of directors and Key Management Personnel and, in particular, when assisting the Board of Directors, submitting proposals or expressing opinions (i) on the general

criteria for the remuneration of directors and Key Management Personnel; and (ii) on any annual and long-term incentive plans.

In line with the provisions of the Corporate Governance Code, the Remuneration and Appointments Committee has its own Regulations, approved on 19 May 2022.

The Committee meets as often as necessary to carry out its activities, normally on the dates set out in the annual meetings calendar prepared and approved by the same Committee and, in any case, whenever the Chairperson deems it appropriate.

If the Board of Directors has not already provided for, on the proposal of the Chairperson, after consulting the Chairperson of the Board of Directors and the Chief Executive Officer, the Committee identifies a Committee secretary on the basis of competences and responsibilities, also chosen from outside its own members, who is entrusted with the task of drawing up the minutes of the meetings and assisting the Committee in carrying out its related activities.

The Chairperson of the Board of Statutory Auditors or another standing auditor designated by the same may participate in the meetings of the Committee; in any case, all standing auditors may also participate. The Chairperson may from time to time invite the Chairperson and/or Vice Chairperson (if appointed) and/or the Chief Executive Officer, as well as other members of the Board of Directors, to the Committee meetings, without voting rights and on condition they have no vested interest in the topics to be discussed. Representatives of the company departments, employees and management staff of the Company, as well as external experts and consultants may also be invited to participate in the meetings of the Committee, whose presence may help to better perform the functions of the Committee itself. No director takes part in the meetings of the Committee in which proposals are formulated to the Board of Directors relating to his/her own remuneration.

In addition, the Chief People, Culture & ESG Officer assists the Committee and fulfils the engagements assigned to them by the Committee for the performance of their functions.

The meetings of the Remuneration and Appointments Committee are recorded in minutes.

As of the Date of the Report, in compliance with the provisions of the Corporate Governance Code, the Remuneration and Appointments Committee is composed only of non-executive and independent directors and is chaired by an independent director:

Name and Surname	Role in the Committee	Office
Laura Capiello	Chairperson	Independent and non-executive director
Fioranna Vittoria Negri	Member	Independent and non-executive director
Diego Pistone	Member	Independent and non-executive director

Fioranna Vittoria Negri was deemed as a member of the Remuneration and Appointments Committee to have adequate knowledge and experience in financial matters and remuneration policies, taking into account the experience gained as a chartered accountant in more than 35 years of professional activity in the field of auditing and business consultancy (including the professional activity carried out as a member of the Board of Statutory Auditors and of the Supervisory Body of listed companies).

For further information on the Remuneration and Appointments Committee, please refer to Section 6.1. (pursuant to Article 123-bis(2)(d), of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance) of the CG Report, available on the Company’s website (www.juventus.com, in the Club, Investors, Shareholders’ Meetings section) and on the authorised storage site “1Info” www.1info.it.



3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE REMUNERATION POLICY AND COMPENSATION AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYEES

The Company has adopted a remuneration system entitled the Total Reward Framework (the “**Total Reward Framework**”). The framework addresses the needs and motivations of resources and defines a set of tools outlining reward strategies tailored to and consistent with the different workforce clusters, within a single, fair and transparent structure.

More specifically, the Total Reward Framework is based on a ‘banding’ system. The system divides company roles into 8 different bands (i.e. contiguous classes of jobs) which are assessed according to Mercer’s International Positioning Evaluation (IPE) method and include consistent roles in terms of responsibility, level of complexity managed and level of impact on corporate results.

The banding system is the cornerstone on which resource management, reward and development processes are built.

The Total Reward Framework consists of: (i) fixed remuneration, (ii) a short-term incentive component (the “**STI Plan**”) represented by an annual short-term monetary incentive component intended for approximately 140 resources, including the Chief Executive Officer, the General Manager (where appointed) and Key Management Personnel, (iii) a long-term incentive component deriving from a plan based on financial instruments intended for a select group of key resources, including the Chief Executive Officer, the Managing Director and KMP and other employees with strategic roles within the Company or its subsidiaries (the “**LTI Plan**”), and (iv) certain

benefits and ancillary services.

The Total Reward Framework allows Juventus to guarantee all its resources the same work opportunities and fair salary compensation and contract terms.

In addition, Juventus is committed to ensuring an inclusive work environment that is free from discrimination of any kind and in which different features and personal and cultural orientations are regarded as a resource. For this reason, the Company not only strives to observe and apply the regulatory framework of reference, but develops corporate policies designed to guarantee equal opportunities for all different types of workers, with the aim of discouraging any kind of prejudice, harassment and discrimination (for example, related to colour, nationality, ethnicity, culture, religion, sexual orientation, age and disabilities), with full respect for human rights.

This ensures that the cornerstones of the Remuneration Policy - and more in general of the management of its resources - are the principle of internal fairness and the enhancement of merit and of distinctive and critical professional skills. The Remuneration Policy is indeed defined and implemented fully in line with the HR strategic planning process and with the results of the assessments on the skills, potential and performance of individual workers; at the same time, it is aligned to the specific needs of the labour market in which the Group operates.

4. INDEPENDENT EXPERTS

The Company did not make use of independent experts for the preparation of the Remuneration Policy. However, it was drawn up in consideration of the activities carried out by Mercer Italia S.r.l., an

international consultancy firm, with respect to the definition of the Total Reward Framework and the remuneration policies in previous years.

5. PURPOSE, PRINCIPLES AND DURATION OF THE REMUNERATION POLICY, AS WELL AS REVISION COMPARED TO THE PREVIOUS YEAR’S REMUNERATION POLICY. VOTING AND CONSIDERATIONS OF THE SHAREHOLDERS’ MEETING

According to the law, the Remuneration Policy has a maximum duration of three financial years, subject to the Board of Directors’ right to submit to the Shareholders’ Meeting a new Remuneration Policy and/or any amendment deemed appropriate before this term.

The Remuneration Policy defines the principles and guidelines for determining the remuneration of the members of the Board of Directors and the General Manager and also determines the reference criteria for establishing the remuneration of the other Juventus’ Key Management Personnel, in line with the governance model adopted by the Company and with the recommendations of the Corporate Governance Code.


Specifically, the aim of the Remuneration Policy is to:

- attract and motivate resources with the necessary skills and professional qualities to perform the tasks and responsibilities assigned to them, while promoting the commitment of strategic resources;
- pursue and promote the creation of sustainable value for Shareholders, while respecting the interests of all other stakeholders;
- pursue and promote the sustainable success of the organisation in the medium-long term, in keeping



- with the strategic priorities and the ESG strategy, through appropriate incentive systems;
- develop a culture based on the recognition of merit, through a balanced, fair and effective remuneration structure and incentive mechanisms.

To achieve the above-mentioned objectives, the Remuneration Policy has been formulated in keeping with the following principles:



The main elements of review with respect to the 2024 Remuneration Policy concern certain amendments to the STI Plan, including the introduction of the sports gate and the amendment of the ESG KPI.

Lastly, it should be noted that the 2024 Remuneration Policy was approved by the Shareholders' Meeting of 7

November 2024 with 99.619793% of the votes cast in favour by the attending shareholders and 84.674503% of the total voting rights; no opinions were expressed on supplementing or amending the Remuneration Policy during said meeting.

6. DESCRIPTION OF POLICIES ON FIXED AND VARIABLE COMPONENTS

DIRECTORS

The Remuneration Policy establishes that directors are paid:

1. fixed annual remuneration decided by the Shareholders' Meeting pursuant to Articles 2364, paragraph 1, no. 3) and 2389 of the Italian Civil Code, as allocated by the Shareholders' Meeting or by the Board of Directors;
2. any additional compensation related to participation in internal committees of the Board of Directors;
3. any additional compensation for special offices, pursuant to Article 2389(3) of the Italian Civil Code;
4. any short- and long-term variable remuneration for executive directors.

FIXED REMUNERATION

It should be noted that the Board of Directors in office as at the Report Date will expire upon approval of the financial statements as at 30 June 2025 by the Shareholders' Meeting scheduled for 7 November 2025. In this context, the Shareholders' Meeting will be called upon to appoint a new managing body and determine the relevant remuneration.

For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the Shareholders' Meeting, held on 18 January 2023, in the context of the appointment of the Board of Directors for the three-year period 2022/2023 - 2024/2025, resolved to award, pro rata temporis in relation to the duration of stay in office, an annual gross compensation of Euro 40,000 to each director,

in addition to the reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses incurred, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 2389, paragraph 3, of the Italian Civil Code.

REMUNERATION RELATED TO THE PARTICIPATION IN INTERNAL COMMITTEES OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

For the entire term of office of the Board of Directors, the following are provided for: (i) annual gross remuneration for the members of the Remuneration and Appointments Committee, amounting to Euro 15,000 to the Chairperson and Euro 10,000 to all other members, in addition to the reimbursement of expenses incurred in performing their respective functions; (ii) annual gross remuneration for the members of the Control and Risk Committee, who is also assigned the function of committee for "transactions with related parties", amounting to Euro 15,000 to the Chairperson and Euro 10,000 to all other members, in addition to the reimbursement of expenses incurred in performing their respective functions; and (iii) annual gross remuneration for the members of the ESG Committee, amounting to Euro 15,000 to the Chairperson and Euro 10,000 to all other members, in addition to the reimbursement of expenses incurred in performing their respective functions.

REMUNERATION FOR SPECIAL OFFICES, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 2389, PARAGRAPH 3, OF THE ITALIAN CIVIL CODE

Remuneration is envisaged for particular offices, pursuant to Article 2389, paragraph 3, of the Italian Civil Code, equal to:

- Euro 400,000 gross per year for the office of Chairperson;
- Euro 800,000 gross per year for the office of Chief Executive Officer⁴.

VARIABLE COMPENSATION FOR EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS

With reference to the members of the Board of Directors, the variable component (both short and long term) is reserved for the Chief Executive Officer.

The maximum variable short-term monetary component connected with the STI Plan that may be obtained by the Chief Executive Officer is Euro 800,000, which corresponds to 100% of the Chief Executive Officer's annual gross fixed pay of Euro 800,000 (95.2%, also considering remuneration as a member of the Board of Directors for a total of Euro 840,000).

It should be noted that minimum variable remuneration is not guaranteed. Moreover, exceeding the KPI-related targets will generate an overperformance payment of up to 150% of the target pay-out.

For further details on the operation of the STI Plan, please refer to Section I, Paragraph 8 of this Report.

As regards the variable long-term component based on financial instruments linked to the LTI Plan, the target LTI share that may be obtained by the Chief Executive Officer is equal to Euro 400,000, which corresponds to 50% of the Chief Executive Officer's annual gross fixed pay of Euro 800,000 (47.6%, also considering remuneration as a member of the Board of Directors for a total of Euro 840,000).

The target LTI share corresponds to a target number of Juventus shares, determined by dividing this value by the arithmetic mean of the Stock Exchange price of an ordinary Juventus share during the three months prior to the start of the relevant vesting period.


Depending on the achievement of the objectives, the number of shares vested may vary from a minimum of 0% up to a maximum of 150% of the target number of shares.

For further details on the operation of the LTI Plan, please refer to Section I, Paragraph 8 of this Report.

Taking into account the compensation for members of the Board of Directors⁵ and the remuneration for the Chief Executive Officer, the related target pay mix (considering the variable remuneration to its maximum extent, with annualization of the long-term component) is determined as follows:

⁴It can be increased up to the higher fixed compensation allocated in accordance with the Remuneration Policy.

⁵Assuming it to be equal to Euro 40,000 gross per year.



GENERAL MANAGER AND OTHER KEY MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL

As of the Date of the Report, Juventus has identified the following 2 persons as Key Management Personnel:

General Manager

Managing Director Corporate & Finance

The above list may undergo changes in the event of the departure or hiring of Key Management Personnel.

The remuneration of Key Management Personnel is established consistently with their roles, responsibilities and professional expertise and was defined by the Board of Directors, after hearing the opinion of the Remuneration and Appointments Committee. Remuneration is divided into fixed and variable parts (both short- and long-term). These portions are appropriately balanced according to the Company's strategic objectives and risk management policy. The fixed component is sufficient to remunerate the service performed even if the variable portion were not paid due to a failure to achieve the performance objectives.

With specific reference to the General Manager, they have an annual gross remuneration of Euro 1,000,000.

The short-term variable component of a monetary nature linked to the STI Plan is equal, to the maximum extent, to 50% of the annual gross fixed remuneration.

It should be noted that minimum variable remuneration is not guaranteed. Moreover, exceeding the KPI-related targets will generate an overperformance payment of up to 150% of the target pay-out.

For further details on the operation of the STI Plan, please refer to Section I, Paragraph 8 of this Report.

With regard to the long-term variable component based on financial instruments linked to the LTI Plan, the target LTI share is equal to 50% of the gross annual remuneration.


The target LTI share corresponds to a target number of Juventus shares, determined by dividing this value by the arithmetic mean of the Stock Exchange price of an ordinary Juventus share during the three months prior to the start of the first vesting period.

Depending on the achievement of the objectives, the number of shares vested may vary from a minimum of 0% up to a maximum of 150% of the target number of shares.

For further details on the operation of the LTI Plan, please refer to Section I, Paragraph 8 of this Report.

The target pay mix - considering the variable remuneration to its maximum extent, with annualization of the long-term component - of the General Manager

and Key Management Personnel is determined as follows:



STATUTORY AUDITORS

Pursuant to the law and the Company By-Laws, the remuneration of the members of the control body is established by the Shareholders' Meeting at the time of appointment for the entire period of their office.

The Shareholders' Meeting of 7 November 2024 resolved to set at Euro 30,000 the annual compensation paid to the Chairperson and Euro 20,000 the annual compensation paid to the other two members of the Board of Statutory Auditors.

7. NON-MONETARY BENEFITS AND INSURANCE COVERAGE, I.E. SOCIAL SECURITY OR PENSIONS, OTHER THAN MANDATORY BENEFITS

All directors are recipients of supplementary forms of insurance such as directors' third-party liability policies, in relation to claims for compensation for non-intentional acts carried out in the performance of their office.

Furthermore, in line with best practices in remuneration policies and in consideration of the specific roles assigned, the remuneration package of those with

special offices, the General Manager and other Key Management Personnel can envisage non-monetary benefits (such as the use of company cars), personal insurance, supplementary health care benefits, participation in the Flexible Benefit Plan adopted by the Company within the limits of Euro 15,000 net per year, tax/legal assistance services and a housing allowance, for a maximum amount of Euro 50,000 net per year.

8. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES THAT FORM THE BASIS FOR ASSIGNING THE VARIABLE REMUNERATION COMPONENTS AND ASSESSMENT OF THEIR ACHIEVEMENT. VESTING PERIODS, ANY DEFERRED PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND ANY EX-POST CORRECTION MECHANISMS

STI PLAN

The types of objectives of the STI Plan (the “**Performance Objectives**”) are identified based on the strategic priorities of the Company and the individual functions. The three performance macro-objectives are as follows:

- 1.an economic/financial KPI, represented by EBIT as indicated below (the “**Economic/Financial Objective**”) (weight equal to 70%);
- 2.Strategic KPIs for each function, as quantifiable and measurable targets, correlated to the role (the “**Strategic Function Targets**”) (weight equal to 20%);
- 3.an ESG KPI, based on the active participation in

well-being (physical, mental, preventive) business initiatives by the recipients of the STI Plan (the “**ESG Targets**”) (weight equal to 10%).

Performance Targets are independent of each other; as a result of this, the final bonus of the incentive to be disbursed to each Beneficiary corresponds to the sum of the bonuses linked to the achievement of each target.

The target chart model for the Chief Executive Officer, the General Manager and other KMP is composed as follows:

1. ECONOMIC/FINANCIAL TARGETS

EBIT Targets (as % of EBIT Targets)	Share of the Bonus accrued with reference to the EBIT Targets
< 100% – Buffer	0%
= 100% – Buffer	50%
= 100%	100%
≥ 100% + Buffer	150%
Interim levels will be calculated by linear interpolation	

The EBIT target level is the value envisaged by the annual budget, with the application of a buffer of Euro 10 million. In particular, given the sensitivity of the data and the strategic relevance, reference is made

to performance levels determined in comparison with budget values without making explicit the relative numbers.

2. STRATEGIC FUNCTION TARGETS DEFINED BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Strategic targets for each function, which are approved (the “**Strategic Function Targets**”):

- with reference to the Chief Executive Officer and the General Manager, by the Board of Directors, subject to the favourable opinion of the Remuneration and Appointments Committee and with the support of the People, Culture & ESG Department in coordination with any other competent departments;
- with reference to the other Key Management Personnel, with the support of the People, Culture &

ESG Department in coordination with other competent departments.

The Chief Executive Officer’s Strategic Function Targets are as follows:

- value of the corporate operating costs recorded for the 2025/2026 financial year compared to the budget values (40% weight on the strategic KPI):

Corporate operating costs recorded for 2025/2026	Payout component
Lower than threshold value	0%
Equal to threshold value	50%
Equal to Target value	100%
Equal or higher than the overperformance value	150%
Interim levels will be calculated by linear interpolation	

- value of the Commercial revenue recorded for the 2025/2026 financial year compared to the budget values (40% weight on the strategic KPI)

Commercial revenue recorded for 2025/2026	Payout component
Lower than threshold value	0%
Equal to threshold value	50%
Equal to Target value	100%
Equal or higher than the overperformance value	150%
Interim levels will be calculated by linear interpolation	

- *sports performance of the first team (20% weight on the strategic KPI)*

2025/2026 <i>sports performance</i> of the First Team	Payout component
No UCL qualification	0%
UCL knockout play-offs and UCL qualification 2026/2027 season	50%
UCL round of 16 and third place Serie A 25/26	100%
UCL quarter-finals and second place Serie A 25/26	150%

The General Manager’s Strategic Function Targets are as follows:

- value of the Commercial revenue recorded for the 2025/2026 financial year compared to the budget values (weight of 50% on the strategic KPI)

Commercial revenue recorded for 2025/2026	Payout component
Lower than threshold value	0%
Equal to threshold value	50%
Equal to Target value	100%
Equal or higher than the overperformance value	150%
<i>Interim levels will be calculated by linear interpolation</i>	

- *sports performance of the First Team (50% weight on the strategic KPI)*

2025/2026 <i>sports performance</i> of the First Team	Payout component
No UCL qualification	0%
UCL knockout play-offs and UCL qualification 2026/2027 season	50%
UCL round of 16 and third place Serie A 25/26	100%
UCL quarter-finals and second place Serie A 25/26	150%

3. ESG TARGETS

The ESG Targets are based on active participation by all the eligible workforce in the STI Plan in corporate well-being initiatives, at least one activity for each of

the following categories (i) physical activity (Sport Programme and gym), (ii) health/mental health/prevention training, as follows:



The STI Plan provides for a condition of access (known as gate), represented by the qualification of the Men’s First Team for the Champions League in the 2026/2027 season. If the gate target is not achieved, for the Chief Executive Officer, the General Manager and other Key Management Personnel, the bonus will not be accrued, regardless of the level of achievement of the Performance Targets.

In addition, a de-multiplier will apply to the Chief Executive Officer, General Manager and other KMP, as follows: if Net Profit is equal to or less than zero, a 20% reduction is applied to any monetary bonus accrued.

The assessment of the level of achievement of the Economic/Financial Targets and ESG Targets is carried out by the Board of Directors as part of the approval of the reference draft financial statements, on the basis of the financial statement data and/or deriving from internal management reports and other data necessary for the finalisation of the ESG Targets.

With regard to the Strategic Function Targets, the People, Culture & ESG Department collects data for assessing the level of achievement of the same, which will be approved (i) by the Board of Directors, subject to the prior opinion of the Remuneration and Appointments Committee, with reference to the Chief Executive Officer and the General Manager, and (ii) by the Chief Executive Officer with reference to the other KMP.

The target bonus amount is calculated by the People, Culture & ESG Department and the related calculation will be approved:

- with reference to the Chief Executive Officer and the General Manager, by the Board of Directors, subject to the Remuneration and Appointments Committee;
- with reference to the other KMP, by the Chief Executive Officer.


The incentive accrued is disbursed after the approval of the reference financial statements by the Shareholders’ Meeting.

In accordance with the recommendations of the Corporate Governance Code, *malus* and claw-back

clauses are provided for variable incentives related to the STI Plan, on the basis of which the Company is entitled not to pay the variable components or to claim back, within a maximum period of three years from payment of the bonus, all or part of the variable remuneration components, the allocation of which was determined on the basis of data or information that subsequently proves to be manifestly misstated or determined in the presence of fraudulent conduct or gross negligence by the recipients.

In the case of specific situations, which may involve changes in the shareholding structure, in the company perimeter or in the method of representing accounting information, such as, by way of a non-exhaustive example, mergers and spin-offs, change of control, share capital increases, transfers of business units as well as legislative or regulatory changes or significant events outside the normal course of business of the Company or, in general, other circumstances likely to affect the Plan, the Board of Directors, having heard the opinion of the Remuneration and Appointments Committee for any aspects within its purview, has the right to make all the amendments and additions deemed necessary and/or appropriate, at its discretion and irrevocably, to the STI Plan form, the objectives, the measurement criteria and the performance indicators contained therein, to keep the essential economic contents of the STI Plan unchanged as much as possible, in compliance with the objectives and purposes pursued by the same and the economic rights recognised by the same, as well as by the legislation in force at the time.

STRUCTURE OF THE PLAN



LTI PLAN

The LTI Plan is divided into three assignment cycles, each of which provides for the allocation of a certain number of rights to obtain ownership of the Company's shares upon achievement of performance targets over a three-year reference period (vesting period: 1st cycle 2024/2025-2026/2027, 2nd cycle 2025/2026-2027/2028, 3rd cycle 2026/2027-2028/2029).

The LTI Plan was approved by the Shareholders' Meeting on 7 November 2024.

The LTI Plan provides for the allocation of maximum 3,000,000 rights, valid for the allocation of maximum 3,000,000 Juventus shares.

For each allocation cycle, the Company will determine the number of rights to be assigned to each beneficiary on the basis of an indicator equal to a percentage of the gross annual fixed compensation of each beneficiary ("Target LTI Share"), taking into account the relative position in the company organisation and dividing this monetary total value by the average Stock Exchange price of the Company's ordinary share in the three months prior to the start of the vesting period.

In particular, the Chief Executive Officer, the General Manager and KMP, in line with the recommendations of the Corporate Governance Code, will be obliged to hold continuously a number of Shares equal to 100% of those to be assigned until the expiry of 24 months from the delivery of the Shares, net of transferable Shares for the payment of tax, social security and welfare expenses, where due, connected to the assignment of the Shares.

The LTI Plan envisages economic/financial performance objectives consistent with the strategic plan, value creation objectives and indicators related to ESG issues.

OBJECTIVE SHEET

The performance indicators relevant to the accrual of rights are as follows:

1) EBIT-Adjusted Cash Flow matrix

This target is linked to the cumulative EBIT⁶ and Adjusted Cash-Flow⁷ results over the three-year reporting period, which are related to each other in a matrix with the aim of strengthening the focus on the joint achievement of cash results and profit.

The relative weight is 70%.

Considering the sensitivity of the data and the strategic relevance, details are provided hereunder of the percentages of the attributable shares corresponding to performance levels determined with respect to plan target values without making the relative figures explicit.

		Cumulative EBIT					
Adjusted cumulative Cash Flow	% performance vs livello target	< 75%	75% - 95%	95% - 105%	105% - 125%	125% - 140%	≥ 140%
	< 75%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	75% - 95%	0.0%	50.0%	70.0%	80.0%	90.0%	100.0%
	95% - 105%	0.0%	70.0%	100.0%	107.5%	115.0%	122.5%
	105% - 125%	0.0%	80.0%	107.5%	115.0%	122.5%	130.0%
	125% - 140%	0.0%	90.0%	115.0%	122.5%	130.0%	140.0%
	≥ 140%	0.0%	100.0%	122.5%	130.0%	140.0%	150.0%

⁶ EBIT: cumulative consolidated Earnings Before Interest and Taxes over the relevant Vesting Period.
⁷ Adjusted Cash Flow: Total consolidated Cash Flow on the reference Vesting Period (i.e. the difference between the Net Financial Position at the beginning of the Vesting Period and that at the end of the Vesting Period), adjusted for: (i) the inclusion of the net change between inception and end of the Vesting Period of receivables/payables from other clubs (both current and non-current), as per the IFRS financial statements, net of VAT and IFRS implicit interest adjustments; and (ii) the exclusion of any significant and non-recurring cash inflows/outflows not related to ordinary activities determined by the Board of Directors, such as, for example, significant financial transactions (e.g. non-recourse assignment of receivables, disposal/purchase of equity investments, capital/dividend increases), material real estate transactions (purchase of J Hotel, disposal of J Village units), any other non-recurring revenues/expenses of a significant amount and considered extraordinary by the Board of Directors.

2) Relative Total Shareholder Return – rTSR.

This target is linked to the Relative Total Shareholder Return, determined on the basis of the positioning of

Juventus with respect to the companies listed on the FTSE Mid Cap index as illustrated below:



A positioning of Juventus below the median value of the TSR entails non-attribution of the shares pertaining to this indicator.

This target has a weight of 15% for the first allocation cycle and 20% for the second allocation cycle.

3) ESG KPI: Gender Equality Certification.

This objective is linked to an ESG indicator that pertains to the Gender Equality certification (PdR UNI 125: 2022), introduced by the NRRP (National, Recovery

and Resilience Plan), as indicated below.


Specifically, the Gender Equality certification will be assessed at the end of the performance period and will determine the pay-out of the incentive related to the ESG KPI.

Access to certification by the Certification Body is envisaged if a minimum overall summary score of at least 60% is achieved, calculated as follows:

- first allocation cycle



- second allocation cycle



This target has a weight of 15% for the first allocation cycle and 10% for the second allocation cycle.

Each performance indicator will be relevant for calculating the number of rights accrued as indicated below, specifically envisaging that, in accordance with performance levels with respect to a threshold, target and maximum value, a portion of the relevant rights of the specific performance indicator will accrue, which may vary in a range from 0 to 150%.

In accordance with the recommendations of the Corporate Governance Code, *malus* and claw-back clauses are also provided for variable incentives related to the LTI Plan, on the basis of which the Company

is entitled not to pay the variable components or to claim back, within a maximum period of three years from payment of the bonus, all or part of the variable remuneration components, the allocation of which was determined on the basis of data or information that subsequently proves to be manifestly misstated or determined in the presence of fraudulent conduct or gross negligence by the recipients.

For more information, please refer to the Information Document.

9. CONTRIBUTION OF THE REMUNERATION POLICY TO THE PURSUIT OF THE COMPANY STRATEGY, LONG-TERM INTERESTS AND SUSTAINABILITY OF THE COMPANY, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE VARIABLE COMPONENTS

The Remuneration Policy is based on criteria found to be in keeping with the pursuit of the Company's interests and the compliance with prudent risk management principles, which contribute to the corporate strategy and the sustainability of the Group's business.

In particular, the Remuneration Policy includes: (i) remuneration adequate to attract, retain and motivate people having the skills and professional qualities required to successfully manage the Company and the Group; (ii) the setting of predetermined and measurable targets, to which variable components are linked, including ESG targets; (iii) other targets relating

to the different functions and specific role held by the recipients of the variable components; (iv) the setting of performance targets in such a way as to avoid their achievement through management choices that have a short-term impact and could potentially undermine the sustainability of the business activity and/or the Group's ability to generate profit in the long term; (v) the absence of variable remuneration for non-executive Directors; and (vi) claw-back mechanisms aimed at preventing variable remuneration from being based on results that have been altered or proven to be manifestly incorrect.

10. INFORMATION ON THE POSSIBLE PROVISION OF CLAUSES FOR KEEPING FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS IN THE PORTFOLIO AFTER THEIR ACQUISITION

As illustrated in paragraph 8, with reference to the LTI Plan, there is an obligation incumbent, *inter alia*, on the Chief Executive Officer, the General Manager and the other KMP to hold continuously a number of shares equal to 100% of those to be assigned until the expiry of 24 months from the delivery thereof, net of transferable shares for the payment of tax, social security and welfare expenses, where due, connected with the assignment of the Shares (lock-up).



11. END OF SERVICE OR END OF EMPLOYMENT ALLOWANCE AND NON-COMPETE CLAUSES

There are no agreements between the Company and the directors, the General Manager or the other Key Management Personnel providing for specific allowances or other special benefits in the event of termination of the office or of the employment or collaboration relationship, or agreements that include non-compete clauses.

With regard to the General Manager and the other Key Management Personnel, the remuneration recognised in the event of termination of the employment relationship is regulated in compliance with and within the limits of the provisions of the national collective labour agreement in force from time to time, applicable to the employment relationship in place.

With reference to the STI Plan, in the event of termination of the employment relationship or directorship, the following rules will apply:

- if, during the performance measurement period (1 July 2025-30 June 2026), a beneficiary's employment relationship or directorship with the Company should end in the presence of one of the assumptions of Bad Leaver, the beneficiary will definitively lose the right to the payment of the bonus;
- in the event of dismissal or redundancy or revocation with just cause in the period between 1 July 2026 (inclusive) and the date of disbursement of the bonus, the beneficiary will definitively lose the right to the disbursement of the bonus;
- if, before the end of the period subject to performance measurement, the beneficiary's employment relationship or directorship with the Company ends in the presence of one of the Good Leaver assumptions, the Beneficiary will retain the right to obtain, at the end of the annual period, if the performance conditions are met, a pro-rata quantity of the bonus. More specifically, the month of termination will be included in the pro-rata calculation if the termination takes effect after the 15th day of the same. In the event of termination of the employment relationship or directorship after the end of the measurement period (30 June 2026) in the case of Good Leaver, the right accrues in full;

It also remains understood that, in the event of the transfer of the employment relationship or directorship to another Group company and/or in the case of the termination of the relationship and simultaneous establishment of a new relationship in the Group, the beneficiary will retain all rights attributed to them.

For the purposes of the STI Plan, Good Leaver means any case in which the employment relationship or directorship is terminated as a result of:

- death or permanent disability of the Beneficiary;
- termination of the employment relationship of the Beneficiary because of retirement/due to the conditions for retirement pension being met;
- resignation of the Beneficiary for proven just cause.

All cases not listed under Good Leavers are to be considered included in the cases of Bad Leaver.

For information on the treatment pursuant to the LTI Plan in the event of termination of the office or employment relationship, please refer to the Information Document.



12. INSURANCE COVERAGE, SOCIAL SECURITY OR PENSIONS, OTHER THAN MANDATORY BENEFITS

Social security or pensions, other than mandatory benefits are not envisaged. As regards insurance coverage, supplementary policies are generally provided for life coverage, permanent disability,

occupational and non-occupational injuries and reimbursable health plans.

13. REMUNERATION POLICY FOLLOWED WITH REFERENCE TO INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS, PARTICIPATION IN COMMITTEES AND THE PERFORMANCE OF PARTICULAR OFFICES

There is no specific remuneration policy in place for Independent Directors.

In accordance with the recommendations of the Corporate Governance Code, the remuneration of independent directors, or however, directors not holding special offices, does not include a variable component linked to the economic results achieved by the Company. This remuneration is however considered as sufficient to attract, motivate and retain directors with the professional qualities required to

contribute to the Company's success.

For information on the remuneration linked to participation in Board of Directors' internal committees, please refer to Section I, paragraph 6 of this Report.

For information on the remuneration for particular offices, pursuant to Article 2389, paragraph 3, of the Italian Civil Code, please refer to Section I, paragraph 6 of this Report.

14. REFERENCE REMUNERATION POLICIES

Comparison with the market is essential in the process of drawing up the Remuneration Policy. In this regard, Remuneration Policy was also defined taking into account the activities carried out in the context of preparing remuneration policies of past years with the support of Mercer Italia S.r.l., which in turn were defined in consideration of timely monitoring of best practices on remuneration and market trends, in terms of remuneration components, pay mix and incentive systems, with the aim of ensuring the competitiveness of the remuneration offer and ensuring the ability to attract, retain and motivate key people.

A benchmarking analysis was carried out to define the variable pay framework, in order to align the Juventus variable incentive systems to best market practices. Specifically, the benchmarking group took into account more than 20 companies belonging to different sectors, to adequately represent the excellence of Juventus and the areas in which it operates, such as Sport, Luxury, Media & Entertainment, Games and Gambling.

In addition, the Remuneration and Appointments Committee carried out a remuneration benchmarking activity, with the help of the People, Culture & ESG Department, to check the competitiveness of the remuneration packages of the Chief Executive Officer and the Chairperson of the Board of Directors on the basis of a reference peer group.

In particular, the peer group was set up using a strict method consisting of the application and weighing of specific comparability criteria on the basis of which a company evaluation was conducted including only companies that were suitable for comparison and more comparable.

15. ELEMENTS OF THE REMUNERATION POLICY WHICH, IN THE PRESENCE OF EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, MAY BE WAIVED AND, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE PROVISIONS OF REGULATION NO. 17221 OF 12 MARCH 2010, ANY ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE EXCEPTION MAY BE APPLIED

Pursuant to Article 123-ter, paragraph 3-bis of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance, the Company may temporarily derogate from the Remuneration Policy in the presence of exceptional circumstances, meaning situations in which the derogation from the Remuneration Policy is necessary for the purpose of pursuing long-term interests and the sustainability of the Company as a whole or to ensure correct negotiation of the security.

“Exceptional circumstances” include, but are not limited to:

- (i) the occurrence, at national or international level, of extraordinary and unforeseeable events, concerning the Company and/or the Group and/or sectors and/or markets in which they operate, which significantly affect the results of the Company and/or the Group, including the occurrence of significant negative effects not only of an economic or financial nature;
- (ii) substantial changes in the organisation of the business activity, both of an objective nature (such as extraordinary operations, mergers, disposals, etc.), and of a subjective nature, such as significant changes in the structure of the Board of Directors or the Key Management Personnel;
- (iii) significant changes in the scope of the company's activity during the term of the Remuneration Policy, such as the sale of a company/business unit on whose activity the performance targets of the Remuneration Policy were based, or the acquisition of a significant business not considered when preparing the Remuneration Policy.

Any exceptions will be approved by the Board of Directors subject to the prior favourable opinion of the Remuneration and Appointments Committee (also for aspects relating to the regulations for transactions with related parties).

Without prejudice to the above, derogations from the Remuneration Policy may concern (i) the remuneration of new roles introduced in the governance structure, (ii) the remodulation of the performance targets to which the variable remuneration is linked and the frequency with which the targets are set, (iii) the revision of the criteria used to assess the targets, (iv) a change in the ratio between fixed and variable components of remuneration, (v) the awarding of one-off monetary bonuses (also in the case of new managerial figures joining, (vi) the allocation of special bonuses and/or indemnities, in order to take into account the aforementioned exceptional circumstances and only if necessary to achieve the interests specified above.

Any approved derogations, which may concern the above-mentioned components of the Remuneration Policy, will be disclosed in the subsequent Report on Remuneration Policy and Compensation Paid, accompanied by the reasons that required the Company to grant the derogation.

SECTION II

This Section II - prepared in accordance with Article 123-ter, paragraph 4, of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance - will be submitted to the non-binding vote of the Shareholders' Meeting, pursuant to Article 123-ter, paragraph 6, of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance.

The Independent Auditors Deloitte & Touche S.p.A. have checked that the directors have prepared Section

II of the Report in accordance with the provisions of Article 123-ter (8-bis) of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance. It should be noted that the Independent Auditors have not issued any certification or carried out any assignment to verify the contents of this Section II.

FIRST PART

1. COMPENSATION

Below are detailed the items that make up the compensation paid - for any reason and in any form - in the 2024/2025 financial year to:

- (i) the members of the Board of Directors;
- (ii) the members of the Board of Statutory Auditors;

(iii) the General Manager and other Key Management Personnel.



1.1. BOARD OF DIRECTORS

FIXED REMUNERATION

In the 2024/2025 financial year, the directors were paid gross annual compensation of Euro 40,000.

The compensation for the office of director was not paid to the Chairperson, Gianluca Ferrero, and to the Chief Executive Officer, Maurizio Scanavino, who communicated the waiver of this emolument for the 2024/2025 financial year.

Directors are also reimbursed for expenses incurred in carrying out the activities associated with the job responsibilities.

REMUNERATION FOR SPECIAL OFFICES

Pursuant to Article 2389, par. 3 of the Italian Civil Code, consistently with the provisions of the 2023 Remuneration Policy, the following annual gross compensation was paid in the year 2024/2025:

- Euro 400,000 gross to Gianluca Ferrero, in relation to the office of Chairperson;
- Euro 800,000 gross to Maurizio Scanavino, in relation to the office of Chief Executive Officer.

VARIABLE COMPENSATION AND RATIO OF FIXED TO VARIABLE COMPENSATION

No variable compensation was paid in relation to the 2024/2025 financial year.

NON-MONETARY BENEFITS

Non-monetary benefits of Euro 3,477 were paid to the Chairperson relating to insurance cover and Euro 18,368 gross were paid to the Chief Executive Officer, Maurizio Scanavino, relating to flexible benefits and insurance cover.

INTERNAL COMMITTEES

In the 2024/2025 financial year, the following were paid as compensation for participation in board committees:

- Euro 35,000 gross to Laura Capiello as Chairperson of the Remuneration and Appointments Committee and member of the Control and Risk Committee and of the ESG Committee;

- Euro 35,000 gross to Fioranna Vittoria Negri as Chairperson of the Control and Risk Committee and member of the ESG Committee and the Remuneration and Appointments Committee;
- Euro 35,000 gross to Diego Pistone as Chairman of the ESG Committee and member of the Control and Risk Committee and Remuneration and Appointments Committee.

1.2. BOARD OF STATUTORY AUDITORS

In the 2024/2025 financial year, the following remuneration was paid to the statutory auditors:

- Euro 30,000 gross to Roberto Spada (Chairperson);
- Euro 20,000 gross to Maria Luisa Mosconi (Statutory Auditor);
- Euro 20,000 gross to Roberto Petrignani (Statutory Auditor).

1.3. GENERAL MANAGER AND OTHER KEY MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL

In the 2024/2025 financial year, compensation was paid to 4 members of Key Management Personnel, including the General Manager, Damien Comolli, and the Managing Director Football, Cristiano Giuntoli.

It should be noted that the overall compensation of the General Manager and Managing Director Football, Cristiano Giuntoli (whose employment relationship was terminated on the Date of the Report), respectively, is higher than the higher overall remuneration attributed to members of the Board of Directors.

FIXED REMUNERATION

In the 2024/2025 financial year, gross fixed compensation was paid to Key Management Personnel for a total of Euro 3,250,249 gross, of which Euro 86,045 gross to the General Manager, Damien Comolli, and Euro 2,307,692 gross to the Managing Director Football, Cristiano Giuntoli.

VARIABLE REMUNERATION

No variable compensation was paid in relation to the 2024/2025 financial year.

NON-MONETARY BENEFITS

In the 2024/2025 financial year, non-monetary benefits were paid to Key Management Personnel for a total of Euro 90,816 gross, of which Euro 8,411 gross to the

General Manager, Damien Comolli, and Euro 24,517 gross to the Managing Director Football, Cristiano Giuntoli.

2. AGREEMENTS THAT INCLUDE SEVERANCE IN THE EVENT OF TERMINATION OF OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT

In the 2024/2025 financial year, following the signing of a consensual termination agreement of the sports director's contract with Cristiano Giuntoli, Managing Director Football, the Company disbursed a total of Euro 850,000 gross to the same, of which Euro 825,000 gross as an incentive for early consensual termination and Euro 25,000 gross in a new settlement, all in compliance with and within the limits of the provisions of the applicable national collective labour agreement, according to the provisions of the 2024 Remuneration

Policy.

A sum of EUR 500,000 will also be paid upon the fulfilment of specific conditions relating to his re-employment.

Finally, the termination of the employment relationship resulted in the loss of rights pursuant to the STI Plan for the 2025/2026 financial year.

3. DEROGATION FROM THE REMUNERATION POLICY APPLIED IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

It should first be noted that the financial year 2024/2025 was characterised by an amendment to the organisational structure in the context of which (i) Francesco Calvo, Managing Director Revenue & Institutional Relations, resigned, with effect from 16 June 2025, to undertake a new professional project, (ii) the Company, on 3 June 2025, signed an agreement with Cristiano Giuntoli, Managing Director Football, for the consensual termination of the contract as sports director, and (iii) the Company signed, on 1 June 2025, an agreement with Damien Comolli for the appointment of the latter as General Manager, reporting directly to the Chief Executive Officer, Maurizio Scanavino, starting from 4 June 2025, with responsibilities in the Football Area and Revenue Area.

In view of the foregoing, it should be noted that, pursuant to Article 123-ter, paragraph 3-bis of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance and in line with the indications in the 2023 Remuneration Policy, the Company may temporarily derogate from said policy in the presence of exceptional circumstances, meaning situations in which such derogation is necessary for the purpose of pursuing long-term interests and the sustainability of the Company as a whole or to ensure correct negotiation of the security. Pursuant to the 2024 Remuneration Policy, (i) "exceptional

circumstances" include, but are not limited to, *inter alia*, substantial changes in the organisation of the business activity of a subjective nature, such as significant changes in the structure of the Board of Directors or Key Management Personnel; and (ii) the derogation may concern, *inter alia*, the awarding of one-off monetary bonuses to take account of the aforementioned exceptional circumstances and only to the extent that this is instrumental to the pursuit of the interests indicated above.

In light of the above, the Board of Directors, subject to the favourable opinion of the Remuneration and Appointments Committee, acknowledged the occurrence in the 2024/2025 financial year of exceptional circumstances within the terms set forth in the 2024 Remuneration Policy and, with a view to setting a competitive salary for the General Manager in order to attract and retain a highly qualified person who, assuming specific and strategic roles in the area of "Football" and "Revenue", resolved to grant the General Manager a one-off amount as a so-called signing bonus of Euro 950,000 gross.

The Company reserves the right to request the return of the signing bonus (i) in the event that the General Manager is liable, with wilful or gross negligence, for

violations of laws and/or regulations, of the Code of Ethics or Company rules that are relevant to or have an impact on the employment relationship, affecting the relevant fiduciary assumption, and/or (ii) in the event of termination of the employment relationship with the Company in the event of resignation without just cause or redundancy with just cause within 18 months from the disbursement of the bonus. This claw-back

right may be exercised by the Company no later than 18 months from the disbursement of the bonus. In the event that the claw-back right is exercised as a result of the resignation of the General Manager without just cause, the amount to be returned will be equal to 1/18 of the bonus for each remaining month from the date of resignation (included) until the expiry of the eighteenth month from the disbursement of the bonus.

4. APPLICATION OF EX POST CORRECTION MECHANISMS OF THE VARIABLE COMPONENT (MALUS OR RETURN OF CLAW-BACK VARIABLE COMPENSATION)

In the 2024/2025 financial year, there was no application of ex-post correction mechanisms for the variable component (*malus* or return of claw-back variable compensation).

5. COMPARATIVE INFORMATION

Comparative information is provided below for the years 2020/2021 to 2024/2025, relating to the annual changes in:



(I) TOTAL REMUNERATION PAID BY JUVENTUS TO EACH OF THE PARTIES FOR WHICH THE INFORMATION REFERRED TO IN THIS SECTION II OF THE REPORT IS PROVIDED BY NAME

FINANCIAL YEAR											
amounts in thousands of Euro		2024/2025		2023/2024		2022/2023		2021/2022		2020/2021	
Name and surname	Office	Absolute value	% change compared to the previous financial year	Absolute value	% change compared to the previous financial year	Absolute value	% change compared to the previous financial year	Absolute value	% change compared to the previous financial year	Absolute value	% change compared to the previous financial year
Gianluca Ferrero	Chairperson	409.5	1.1%	404.9	122.6%	181.9	n.a	n.a		n.a	
Maurizio Scanavino	Chief Executive Officer	818.4	-32.8%	1,218.6	101.3%	605.4	n.a				
Laura Capiello	Independent Director	75.0	0.0%	75.0	122.6%	33.7	n.a				
Fioranna Vittoria Negri	Independent Director	75.0	0.0%	75.0	122.6%	33.7	n.a				
Diego Pistone	Director	75.0	0.0%	75.0	122.6%	33.7	n.a				
Cristiano Giuntoli	Managing Director Football	3,182.2	8.7%	2,962.2	n.a	n.a	n.a				
Damien Comolli	General Manager	1,044.5	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a				

(II) RESULTS OF JUVENTUS

FINANCIAL YEAR										
amounts in thousands of Euro	2024/2025 ^(*)		2023/2024 ^(*)		2022/2023 ^(*)		2021/2022 ^(*)		2020/2021 ^(*)	
Economic indicator	Absolute value	% change compared to the previous financial year	Absolute value	% change compared to the previous financial year	Absolute value	% change compared to the previous financial year	Absolute value	% change compared to the previous financial year	Absolute value	% change compared to the previous financial year
Revenues	529.6	34.2%	394.6	-22.3%	507.7	14.5%	443.4	-7.8%	480.7	-16.2%
Operating costs	(405.7)	1.4%	(400.1)	-6.4%	(427.6)	-8.7%	(468.4)	0.4%	(466.3)	11.8%
Amortisation/depreciation, write-downs and provisions	(153.9)	-9.4%	(169.9)	-5.2%	(179.3)	-8.8%	(196.7)	-14.0%	(228.6)	1.0%
Operating profit (loss)	(29.9)	-83.0%	(175.4)	76.6%	(99.3)	-55.2%	(221.7)	3.6%	(214.1)	206.1%
Income before taxes	(50.0)	-74.5%	(196.1)	67.2%	(117.3)	-50.6%	(237.4)	5.7%	(224.7)	165.8%
Net profit (loss)	(58.1)	-70.8%	(199.2)	61.0%	(123.7)	-48.35	(239.3)	5.5%	(226.8)	145.4%

^(*)Starting from the 2020/2021 financial year, the Company is not required to draft consolidated financial statements.

(III) AVERAGE ANNUAL GROSS REMUNERATION, BASED ON FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES, OF EMPLOYEES OF JUVENTUS OTHER THAN THE PARTIES WHOSE REMUNERATION IS REPRESENTED BY NAME IN THIS SECTION II OF THE REPORT

FINANCIAL YEAR										
amounts in thousands of Euro	2024/2025		2023/2024		2022/2023		2021/2022		2019/2020	
	Absolute value	% change compared to the previous financial year	Absolute value	% change compared to the previous financial year	Absolute value	% change compared to the previous financial year	Absolute value	% change compared to the previous financial year	Absolute value	% change compared to the previous financial year
Average gross annual remuneration of full-time employees of Juventus	52.5	10.5%	47.5	-6.5%	50.8	-2.3%	52.0	7.9%	48.2	7.8%

Note: the average gross annual remuneration reported is calculated including the remuneration paid to Managers, Middle Managers, Office Staff, Workers employed as at 30 June 2025 and excluding the remuneration paid to the Key Management Personnel specified in Section I of this Report.

6. VOTE EXPRESSED BY THE SHAREHOLDERS’ MEETING ON SECTION II OF THE REPORT FOR THE PREVIOUS YEAR

The Shareholders’ Meeting of 7 November 2024, in accordance with the provisions of Article 123-ter, paragraph 6, of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance, expressed a non-binding vote on Section II of the Remuneration Report submitted to the same, with the following outcomes:

- votes in favour no. 525,184,278, equal to 99.517725% of the voting rights present and 84.587933% of the total voting rights;
- votes against 2,515,918, equal to 0.476744% of the voting rights present and 0.405222% of the total voting rights;
- abstentions 29,055, equal to 0.005506% of the

- voting rights present and 0.004680% of the total voting rights;
- non-voters 132, equal to 0.000025% of the voting rights present and 0.000021% of the total voting rights.



SECOND PART

The annex provides details of the compensation paid by the Company in the 2024/2025 financial year, for any reason and in any form, to the members of the Board of Directors, Board of Statutory Auditors and Independent Auditors, the General Manager and other Key Management Personnel, as well as the shareholding in the Company held by each of them.

Turin, 26 September 2025

It should be noted that Tables 2 and 3B of Annex 3A, Schedule 7-bis, of the Issuers’ Regulation are not applicable.

On behalf of the Board of Directors

The Chairperson

Gianluca Ferrero



ANNEX 1: COMPENSATION PAID TO THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, BOARD OF STATUTORY AUDITORS, THE GENERAL MANAGER AND OTHER KEY MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL

Amounts in the thousand of Euro				Fixed remuneration			Renumeration related to the part. internal committees Bonus and incetives Non-monetary Benefits Other compensation Totale Severance in the event of termination of office or employment						
Name and surname	Office	Term of office	End of term	Renumeration established by the Shareholder's Meeting	Renumeration for particular offices	Renumeration from employment							
Directors													
Gianluca Ferrero	Director	01/07/2024 - 30/06/2025	2025	(a)		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Chairperson	01/07/2024 - 30/06/2025	2025		400.0	-	-	-	3.5	6.0	(b)	409.5	-
Maurizio Scanavino	Director	01/07/2024 - 30/06/2025	2025	(a)		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Chef Executive Officer	01/07/2024 - 30/06/2025	2025		800.0	-	-	-	18.4	-		818.4	-
Laura Cappiello	Independent Director	01/07/2024 - 30/06/2025	2025	40.0		-	35.0	(c)	-	-	-	75.0	-
Fioranna Vittoria Negri	Independent Director	01/07/2024 - 30/06/2025	2025	40.0		-	35.0	(d)	-	-	-	75.0	-
Diego Pistone	Director	01/07/2024 - 30/06/2025	2025	40.0		-	35.0	(e)	-	-	-	75.0	-
Statutory Auditors													
Roberto Spada	Chairperson	01/07/2024 - 30/06/2025	2025	30.0	-	-			-	-	-	30.0	-
Roberto Petrignani	Statutory Auditor	01/07/2024 - 30/06/2025	2025	20.0								20.0	
Maria Luisa Mosconi	Statutory Auditor	01/07/2024 - 30/06/2025	2025	20.0								20.0	
General Manager and other Key Management Personnel													
Key Management Personnel nr 4 of which				-	-	3,250.2			90.8	956.0	(f) (g)	4,297.0	
Cristiano Giuntoli	Managing Director Football	01/07/2024 - 03/06/2025	03/06/2025	-	-	2,307.7			24.5	-		2,332.2	850.0
Damien Comolli	General Manager	04/06/2025 - 30/06/2025	-	-	-	86.1			8.4	950.0	(f)	1,044.5	-

a) No remuneration for the position of director was paid to the Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer following their waiver of such emolument for the 2024/2025 financial year.

b) Other compensation include remuneration for the position of director held in J Medical S.r.l. (€ 6 thousand).

c) Remuneration for the Chairperson of the Remuneration and Appointments Committee (€15 thousand) and for participation as a member of Control and Risk Committee (€ 10 thousand) and ESG Committe (€ 10 thousand).

d) Remuneration for the Chairperson of the Control and Risk Committee (€15 thousand) and for participation as a member of the Remuneration and Appointments Committee (€10 thousand) and the ESG Committee (€10 thousand)

e) Remuneration for the Chairperson of the ESG Committee (€15 thousand) and for participation as a member of the Control and Risk Committee (€10 thousand) and the Remuneration and Appointments Committee (€10 thousand).

f) One-off monetary bonuses (for details, please refer to paragraph 3 of Section II of this Report).

g) Other compensation include remuneration for the position of director held in J Medical S.r.l. (€6 thousand).

ANNEX 2: INCENTIVE PLANS BASED ON FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS OTHER THAN STOCK OPTIONS

			Financial instru-ments assigned in previous years not vested during the year		Financial instruments assigned during the financial year					Financial instrumen-ts vested during the year and non-attribu-table	Financial instruments vested during the financial year and attributable		Financial instrumen-ts for the financial year
A	B	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Name and Surname	Office	Plan	Number and type of financial instru-ments	Ve- sting price	Number and type of financial instru-ments	Fair value at grant date (in Euro)	Vesting period	Allocation date	Market price at allocation (in Euro)	Number and type of financial instruments	Number and type of financial in-struments	Value at the vesting date	Fair value (in Euro)
Maurizio Scanavino	Chief Executi- ve Officer	Performance Shares Plan Share plan 2024/2025 2028/2029	-	-	307,692 rights	2.09 - 2.46	2024/2025 - 2026/2027	07/10/2024	2.437	-	-	-	172,115
1 member of KMP ^(*)		Performance Shares Plan Share plan 2024/2025 2028/2029	-	-	121,154 rights	2.09 - 2.46	2024/2025 - 2026/2027	07/10/2024	2.437	-	-	-	67,770
Other beneficiaries		Performance Shares Plan Share plan 2024/2025 2028/2029	-	-	333,842 rights	2.09 - 2.46	2024/2025 - 2026/2027	07/10/2024	2.437	-	-	-	207,899

(*) It should be noted that following his resignation, Francesco Calvo, Managing Director Revenue & Institutional Relations, definitively and fully lost the right to receive the shares. The rights granted to it are therefore not included in this table.

ANNEX 3: EQUITY INVESTMENTS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
BOARDS OF DIRECTORS, BOARDS OF STATUTORY AUDITORS AND
INDEPENDENT AUDITORS, THE GENERAL MANAGER AND OTHER
KEY MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL

Table 1 - Equity investments of the Members of the Boards of Directors, Statutory Auditors and Independent Auditors

Name and surname	Position	Number of shares held as of 30 June 2025	Number of shares acquired	Number of shares sold	Number of shares held as of 30 June 2025
As at 30 June 2025, no director/statutory auditor held shares in Juventus					

Table 2 – Equity investments of the General Manager and other Key Management Personnel

Name and surname	Position	Number of shares held as of 30 June 2025	Number of shares acquired	Number of shares sold	Number of shares held as of 30 June 2025
No member of Key Management Personnel holds shares in Juventus as of 30 June 2025					



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